We investigate the e¤ect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to exert e¤ort in a market-based tournament. External employers use promotion decisions to estimate employees'abilities and adjust their wage o¤ers accordingly. Employees exert e¤ort to increase the probability of being promoted and thus to increase their ability assessment and wage o¤er. We demonstrate that ability assessments and wage o¤ers are more sensitive to promotion decisions in the case of heterogeneous employees. Thus, employees have a higher incentive to a¤ect the tournament outcome, and employers …nd it optimal to hire heterogeneous employees.
Introduction
In many …rms, promotions form an important incentive. Employees exert e¤ort to perform better than their colleagues and, thus, to be considered for promotion and concomitantly o¤ered an increase in compensation. The current paper analyzes how heterogeneity among employees a¤ects the incentive to exert e¤ort in a promotion tournament. A rationale for designing heterogeneous promotion tournaments is provided, based on what we believe is an important learning e¤ect that the tournament literature has overlooked.
The seminal study of promotion tournaments is the one by Lazear and Rosen (1981) .
They consider a situation in which two employees compete for a promotion. A key feature of their model is that the employer commits to pay wages (or prizes) to both the promoted and the non-promoted employee before the tournament starts. Lazear and Rosen …nd that heterogeneity among employees is detrimental from an incentive perspective (unless the employer introduces handicaps to counteract the heterogeneity). This is because heterogeneity lowers the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on an employee's probability of being promoted (i.e. of producing higher output than the opponent does). Intuitively, the employee of lower ability realizes that he is unlikely to overcome the ability advantage of the opponent and reduces his e¤ort. Then the employee of higher ability can a¤ord to relax and reduce his e¤ort as well. 1 However, the assumption that the employer can commit to pay di¤erent prizes at the beginning of the tournament has come under recent scrutiny. Following Waldman (1984) , several tournament papers appeared that restrict the power of the employer to commit to a certain set of prizes.
2 Instead, it has been argued that post-tournament wages are determined by a bidding process taking into account promotion decisions. In particular, the labor market (i.e. …rms other than the current employer) understands promotion as a (positive) signal of an employee's ability. Accordingly, promotion induces the labor market to upgrade the assessment of an employee's ability, which consequently leads to higher wage o¤ers for that employee. Therefore, employees have an incentive to vie for promotion.
In such a market-based tournament, employee heterogeneity a¤ects the employees'payo¤ function in two ways. On one hand, the e¤ect is the same as that in the model of Lazear and Rosen: heterogeneity lowers the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of being 1 See Gürtler and Kräkel (2010) . 2 See Zábojník and Bernhardt (2001) , Ghosh and Waldman (2010) , DeVaro (2011) , DeVaro and Waldman (2012) , Zábojník (2012) , Waldman (2013a) .
promoted. On the other hand, heterogeneity has an e¤ect on how the labor market uses promotion decisions to update the assessment of employee ability. In certain situations (i.e. for certain families of ability distributions), ability assessments are more sensitive to promotion decisions when employees are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. This observation is based on the following intuition: If an employee considered to be of low ability is promoted even though he had to compete against a high-ability employee, his ability assessment is substantially upgraded. Similarly, an employee considered to be of high ability su¤ers significant downgrading of his ability assessment when he does not compete successfully against a low-ability employee. A signi…cant change in ability assessment leads to a strong change in the wage o¤ered. In a heterogeneous tournament in which ability assessments, and thus wages, are more sensitive to promotion decisions, employees have a higher incentive to win the tournament. This e¤ect may be so strong that it more than compensates the original e¤ect identi…ed by Lazear and Rosen, so that it is optimal for an employer to hire heterogeneous employees.
Some empirical evidence exists that is in line with the …ndings of the present model. These …ndings indicate that performing well against strong rivals can boost a player's career and thus substantiate the notion that ability assessments are more sensitive to the realization of relative performance signals for heterogeneous contestants. In addition to this anecdotal evidence, several empirical studies provide support for our results. DeVaro and Waldman (2012) analyze data from a medium-sized US …rm in the …nancial-services industry. They …nd that, upon promotion, employees with a Masters degree or a Ph.D. receive a smaller wage increase compared to employees with a Bachelors degree. This observation is consistent with the present result that, following a promotion, the ability assessment of low-ability employees is upgraded by a greater degree than that of high-ability employees. Bognanno and Melero (2012) , using data from the British Household Panel Survey, obtain similar results: less educated employees receive larger wage increases upon promotion. Observations by DeVaro (2006) provide some indirect support for the model presented here. In an analysis of promotion decisions using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, he …nds that employers react to factors that suppress incentives by countering and increasing the spread between winner and loser prizes. This …nding is in line with our results. As indicated, heterogeneity among employees reduces the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of being promoted. This induces employees to reduce their e¤ort. However, as argued before, it is possible that the labor market changes the assessment of employee ability to a greater degree after observing the tournament outcome. As a consequence, the di¤erence in wage o¤ers from external employers to the promoted and non-promoted employee increases. If the current employer matches these external o¤ers, the tendency is to react to higher employee heterogeneity by increasing the spread between prizes. Finally, our model can explain why studies have observed bene…ts from the design of heterogeneous workgroups (e.g., Hamilton et al. 2003, Franck and Nüesch 2010) .
In addition to the literature cited so far, our study is related to the literature on learning in tournaments. This literature focuses on the question of whether tournaments succeed at identifying (and selecting) the most able contestant, in other words, whether the most able contestant wins the tournament. Meyer (1991) , for example, considers a series of tournaments between two heterogeneous employees. She demonstrates that selection e¢ ciency can be improved by biasing the tournament results. If only ordinal information about the employees'performances is available, optimal bias (which in most cases favors the actual leader in the tournament) increases the information content of the tournament such that the information becomes a su¢ cient statistic for cardinal information. Clark and Riis (2001) show that e¢ cient selection can be achieved by combining a promotion tournament with absolute performance standards. In their model, there are three tournament prizes and the tournament winner receives the highest prize only if his performance surpasses a threshold level.
By using performance standards, the employer receives further information about employee ability that he can use to select employees e¢ ciently. Hvide and Kristiansen (2003) emphasize the relevance of the selection problem. They examine a promotion tournament, in which employees can choose strategies that di¤er in risk. They …nd that selection e¢ ciency may be low, because low-ability employees might choose risky strategies that overturn their ability disadvantage. Chen (2003) and Münster (2007) allow for sabotage in tournaments. They …nd that high-ability employees are strongly sabotaged, which in turn leads to low selection e¢ ciency. 3 Höchtl et al. (2011) consider optimal seeding in an elimination tournament with two low and two high-ability employees. The goal of the …rm is to induce employees to exert a high e¤ort and to promote a high-ability employee. The authors demonstrate that these two objectives are con ‡icting and that seeding employees to induce high e¤orts leads to low selection e¢ ciency (and vice versa) . This result is similar to the main …nding of DeVaro and , who consider a promotion tournament in which employees perform multiple tasks. E¢ cient assignment of employees to jobs would require a promotion rule that focuses on the task that is relatively most important in a high-level job. However, such a promotion rule would induce employees to neglect the remaining tasks and thus leads to suboptimal incentives. It should be noted that in all these studies, the employer can either commit to certain tournament prizes at the beginning of the tournament or the prizes are exogenously
given. This means that none of the studies assumes that prizes are o¤ered on the basis of a bidding process in the labor market. Obviously, this approach contrasts with that in the current study, in which the employer's inability to commit to a set of prizes at the beginning of the tournament is a necessary condition for the optimality of employee heterogeneity.
Finally, our analysis is related to Rantakari (2012) , who considers a situation in which each employee exerts two-dimensional e¤ort to a¤ect the value of a project for the employer as also for himself. The project that yields a higher value for the employer is realized by the employer. Accordingly, employees engage in a type of competition against each other, because they prefer their own project to be realized. Rantakari demonstrates that the employer may bene…t from hiring heterogeneous employees. This …nding depends on "winner prizes" being endogenous in the sense that they depend on the employees'e¤orts. This is similar to our contention here, whereby the bene…t that accrues to employees from winning a heterogeneous tournament is greater than the prize for a homogeneous one. In the present model, however, learning of employee abilities is the driving force behind this result.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the market-based tournament. Section 3 investigates the matching of workers to …rms. Section 4 discusses the …ndings and Section 5 concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
3 See also Gürtler and Münster (2010) and Gürtler et al. (2013) .
2 Market-based tournaments
Description of the model and notation
We consider a model of a competitive labor market with two periods, = 1; 2. There are N identical …rms and n workers, all parties are risk-neutral. Each …rm has two di¤erent types of job, a low-level job 1 and a high-level job 2. Jobs are indexed by k = 1; 2. If worker j is hired by …rm i in period and assigned to job k, his output is given by
E¤ort is denoted by e j 0 and ability by t j + " j for worker j. It is assumed that all …rms and all workers observe t j at the beginning of the …rst period. However, there is symmetric uncertainty for " j (i.e. none of the parties knows " j ex ante, as assumed for example in Holmström 1982) . We assume that " j is continuously, identically, and independently distributed. The probability density function (pdf) of " j is assumed to be symmetric around zero with domain [ b; b] . Accordingly, all parties know the expected ability of a worker, t j (e.g. by observing the worker's level of education), but not the actual realization. We impose the condition min ft A ; t B g > b so that ability is always positive. d k and c k > 0 are parameters characterizing worker productivity. Following Waldman (1984) , we assume that c 2 > c 1 (and
, so that output is more responsive to ability in the high-level job. j captures random noise a¤ecting the output produced in period . It is continuously, identically, and independently distributed according to a pdf that is assumed to be symmetric around zero with bounded domain. Finally, s 2 f0; Sg is an indicator variable capturing …rm-speci…c human capital acquired in the …rst period of employment. Its realization is equal to zero (s = 0) if the …rst period is considered or if the second period is considered and worker j has moved to a di¤erent …rm after the …rst period. The variable equals S (s = S > 0) if the second period is considered and the worker continues to work for the same …rm as in the …rst period. E¤ort is costly to the workers and the e¤ort costs are given by c (e j1 ; e j2 ). Costs are increasing, strictly convex, and satisfy @c @e j (0; 0) = 0 for = 1; 2.
Throughout Section 2, we restrict our attention to a representative …rm that has hired two workers (indexed by j = A; B) at the beginning of the …rst period. We assume that the …rm decides to assign both workers to the low-level job 1 in = 1. 4 At the end of the …rst period, the …rm observes the output of each worker and then promotes the worker who has produced the higher output to the high-level job 2. 5 Other …rms cannot observe individual outputs, but can observe which jobs workers have been assigned to at the end of the …rst period. They use this information to update their ability assessment for the two workers.
At the beginning of the second period, other …rms try to hire the two workers by making wage o¤ers. It is assumed that all wage o¤ers (including the one from the current employer)
are made simultaneously. Each worker is hired by the …rm making the highest o¤er. Ties are broken randomly except for the case in which the current employer is among the …rms o¤ering the highest wage. In this case, the worker remains with the current employer. We assume that the parameter constellations are such that if an external …rm were successful in hiring one of the workers, it would always assign this worker to job 1 regardless of whether the worker was assigned to job 1 or job 2 in the initial …rm. 6 We further assume that in equilibrium, …rms are never successful at hiring workers away from other …rms. 7 However, as in Greenwald (1986) and Waldman (2013a) , there is a small probability that workers will in the low-level job …rst to acquire skills that allow them to accomplish the tasks required in the high-level job. Second, we could assume that max ft A ; t B g is rather low, in which case the …rm …nds it optimal to assign both workers to job 1 in = 1. 5 Implicitly, we assume that the …rm always …nds it optimal to promote one of the workers (which, for instance is true if S is su¢ ciently high), but that there is a slot constraint in the high-level job, so it is impossible to assign both workers to job 2. It should be noted that the promotion rule is optimal among all conceivable promotion rules. When deciding which worker to promote, the …rm takes two di¤erent aspects into account. On one hand, it wants to promote the worker with the higher ability (because output is more sensitive to ability in the high-level job); on the other hand, it wants to minimize second-period wage costs.
We show that both workers choose the same e¤ort in equilibrium, so that promotion of the worker with higher …rst-period output is equivalent to promotion of the worker with higher expected ability. Thus, the …rst objective of the …rm is always ful…lled. In addition, it can be shown that total second-period wages do not depend on whether worker A or worker B is promoted (a proof is available from the authors upon request), which demonstrates the optimality of the promotion rule. 6 This assumption is related to the assumption that the …rst-period employer assigns the workers to the low-level job in = 1. Since external …rms assign workers e¢ ciently in = 2 (given their information about abilities) and …rm-speci…c human capital is lost when workers switch employers, assignment of workers to job 1 requires max ft A ; t B g to be rather low. Note, however, that this assumption is not crucial for our results.
All the qualitative results still hold if an external …rm successful in hiring one of the workers always assigns this worker to the high-level job 2. 7 Again, this assumption requires S to be su¢ ciently high so that external …rms are never able to outbid the current employer. switch employers after the …rst period for exogenous reasons that are unrelated to ability and job assignment. As explained in these two papers and in the next subsection, the latter two assumptions eliminate the winner's-curse e¤ect.
Explicit incentive schemes that link pay to performance are not feasible. Furthermore, long-term contracts that bind workers to the …rm for both periods are not feasible either.
There is no discounting.
Model solution
The model is solved by backward induction. Because e¤ort costs increase with the level of e¤ort and the …rms cannot use pay-for-performance schemes, all workers who are hired during the second period choose a second-period e¤ort of zero, e j2 = 0. 8 Hence, worker output is either y
if the worker stays with his current …rm or y
if he moves to another …rm. The ability assessment for a worker depends on whether he is promoted (p j = 1) or not (p j = 0), and so does his secondperiod wage, as indicated by the following lemma (E [ j ] denotes the conditional expectation operator).
9
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium in undominated strategies, the second period wage for worker j is given by d 1 + c 1 E [t j + " j jp j = 1] if he is promoted at the end of the …rst period and by
In the …rst period, the labor market observes which of the two workers is promoted and uses this information to update the assessment of their abilities. Obviously, the workers vie for promotion, because this increases their ability assessment and their second-period 8 The fact that e¤ort is zero is a normalization and should not be taken literally. This should be interpreted as the e¤ort that the workers would choose if there were no (explicit or implicit) incentive pay. Typically, workers exert some "regular" e¤ort level even in the absence of incentive pay, because they experience some utility from working up to a certain point. This regular e¤ort level is normalized to zero in the model. A similar argument is advanced by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Grund and Sliwka (2010) .
In what follows, we simplify the notation by writing e¤ort costs as c (e j1 ) instead of c (e j1 ; 0). 9 In the wage-setting subgame at the beginning of the second period, there exist equilibria in which workers receive wages that di¤er from those speci…ed in Lemma 1. As these equilibria involve weakly dominated strategies (and thus do not survive equilibrium re…nements such as trembling-hand perfection), we neglect these equilibria in what follows.
compensation. Consider worker A. This worker chooses his …rst-period e¤ort to maximize
where P ( ) is the probability operator. Note that the labor market cannot observe the e¤orts of the two workers. Hence, when calculating the expected ability of worker A conditional on second-period job assignment, the labor market has to form a belief regarding these e¤orts. We denote the e¤orts that …rms believe the two workers choose byẽ A1 andẽ B1 and the di¤erence between them by ẽ :=ẽ B1 ẽ A1 . In contrast, the promotion probability P (p A = 1) for worker A depends on the actual e¤ort di¤erence e := e B1 e A1 . We further de…ne t := t B t A ; which serves as our measure of worker heterogeneity, with higher j tj indicating more heterogeneous workers, and :
, which is continuously distributed according to a pdf g that is independent of " j and has bounded domain [ a; a]. Later, we encounter the random variables " A " B + and " A " B . We denote the pdfs of these two random variables by and f and the corresponding cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) by and F , respectively. As is standard in the tournament literature, we assume that and f have a unique mode at zero. Furthermore, we suppose that f is piecewise continuously di¤erentiable on ( 2b; 2b), which implies that is continuously di¤erentiable on ( 2b a; 2b + a).
10 Worker A will be promoted if and only if " A " B + > e + t, so U A can be rewritten as
(1 ( e + t)) c(e A1 ): Optimal e¤ort by worker A is characterized by the following …rst-order condition for his maximization problem:
Analogously, for worker B we obtain
In equilibrium, the labor market correctly anticipates the workers'behavior, and thusẽ A1 = e A1 andẽ B1 = e B1 . Taking all these conditions into account, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 In the tournament, a unique equilibrium exists that is symmetric with both workers choosing the same e¤ort e. e is implicitly de…ned by
where
The condition presented in Lemma 2 clearly shows the two di¤erent e¤ects that worker heterogeneity ( t) has on the incentive to exert e¤ort. On one hand, heterogeneity a¤ects the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of winning, ( t). As demonstrated in the literature, because has a unique mode at t = 0, heterogeneity reduces the incentive to exert e¤ort by lowering the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of winning. On the other hand, worker heterogeneity a¤ects the ability updating process following the promotion decision. For instance, if a worker who is thought to have low ability performs better than a worker of seemingly higher ability, his ability assessment is upgraded by a higher degree than in a situation in which he performs better than a worker of rather low ability. In turn, when the labor market puts greater emphasis on the promotion decision, workers have a higher 11 A typical feature of tournament models is that the cost function must be su¢ ciently convex for the objective function to be strictly concave and to meet the second-order conditions. In what follows, we assume that this is the case, so that optimal e¤orts are indeed characterized by the …rst-order conditions for the maximization problem.
incentive to exert e¤ort to achieve promotion and thus to a¤ect their ability assessment and future compensation. This e¤ect is captured by the term W A ( t). The following proposition indicates how W A ( t) changes when workers are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous.
Then W A has a local minimum at t = 0.
Starting from a situation with homogeneous workers ( t = 0), introduction of worker heterogeneity has two countervailing e¤ects on the wage di¤erential for each of the workers considered. Consider the worker with the lower expected ability. If this worker is promoted even though he had to compete against a stronger rival, his ability assessment is signi…cantly upgraded. This e¤ect increases the wage di¤erential and thus the worker's incentive to exert e¤ort. By the same token, however, downgrading of the worker's ability assessment if he is reassigned to the low-level job is rather weak, which attenuates his incentive to exert e¤ort.
If the worker with the higher expected ability is promoted, his ability assessment does not increase much, because he had to outperform only a weak rival. Instead, if the worker is not promoted, his ability assessment is strongly downgraded. Again, we observe countervailing e¤ects of heterogeneity on the wage di¤erential and the incentive to exert e¤ort.
Proposition 1 o¤ers conditions under which the positive incentive e¤ects dominate the negative e¤ects, so that W A ( t) reaches a local minimum at t = 0. 13 In particular, both E [(" A " B ) I(" A " B + > 0)] and (0) are required to be rather high. Note that
and (0) is the value of the pdf of " A " B + at its zero mean. Suppose we begin at t = 0 and introduce a small amount of heterogeneity by slightly increasing t to t > 0. Consider the weaker worker. As explained before, promotion leads to a greater change in this worker's ability assessment, because he has to compete against a stronger rival. More speci…cally, the ability assessment in a situation in which the worker is pro- is high, values close to zero (i.e. at the left tail of the conditional distribution) are assigned a signi…cant weight when E [" A j" A " B + > 0] is calculated, but are truncated when E " A " A " B + > t is determined. Furthermore, the positive e¤ect of a high value of
is intensi…ed when the dispersion of the random variables is high. This is intuitive. Truncation of the pdf of " A " B + at t leads to a stronger shift of the considered probability mass to the right tail of the distribution (i.e. to high values of " A ) for greater dispersion of the random variables. As a consequence, the positive incentive e¤ects of an introduction of heterogeneity are particularly strong if both E [(" A " B ) I(" A " B + > 0)] and (0) are high.
If the conditions from Proposition 1 are met, a direct implication is that the ability assessment for the workers is more responsive to the promotion decision in the case of heterogeneous workers than in the case of homogeneous workers, at least if heterogeneity is not substantial.
As just explained, worker heterogeneity thus has a positive e¤ect on their incentive to exert e¤ort. The following proposition shows that this e¤ect is so strong that it may outweigh the negative e¤ect of heterogeneity on the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of winning, inducing workers to choose a higher e¤ort in a heterogeneous tournament.
Proposition 2 Let the assumptions from Proposition 1 be valid and let 0 be continuously di¤erentiable on ( 2b a; 2b + a). Furthermore, let
Then optimal e¤ort e has a local minimum at t = 0.
Proposition 2 is very intuitive. It simply states that if the positive e¤ects of worker heterogeneity on the incentive to exert e¤ort dominate the negative ones, e¤ort has a local minimum at t = 0. Accordingly, workers exert higher e¤ort in a heterogeneous tournament than in a homogeneous one.
We conclude this section with a brief example that highlights the optimality of heterogeneous tournaments in terms of e¤ort provision. Suppose that " A and " B are uniformly distributed on [ b; b], which implies that f is piecewise di¤erentiable on [ 2b; 2b]. Suppose further that is uniformly distributed on [ a; a] with 0 < a < 2b. It can then be shown that
It immediately follows that for a su¢ ciently close to zero, the condition
is met. Since 00 (0) = 0 and W 00 A (0) > 0 the conditions from Propositions 1 and 2 are satis…ed, so that equilibrium e¤ort is higher in a situation with heterogeneous workers relative to a situation with homogeneous workers.
Matching of workers to …rms
In this section, we analyze how workers are matched to …rms at the beginning of the …rst period. We assume that each …rm can hire exactly two workers or none at all. There are two types of workers, workers with high expected ability t H (type 1) and workers with low expected ability t L < t H (type 2). There are n 2 workers of type 1 and n 2 workers of type 2, where n 2 < N . We assume that the conditions from Proposition 2 are met and that t := t H t L is su¢ ciently small, so that workers choose a higher e¤ort if the other worker hired along with them is of a di¤erent type rather than of the same type. Induction of higher e¤ort is bene…cial only if e¤ort is not already ine¢ ciently high. Given that the second-period e¤ort is zero, the …rst-period e¤ort e that maximizes total surplus is characterized by the …rst-order condition c 0 (e ) = c 1 . To ensure that the equilibrium e¤ort is never ine¢ ciently high (so that e e ), the following additional assumption is made:
The following proposition then demonstrates that the …rms decide to hire heterogeneous workers and thus to implement heterogeneous tournaments. This is because heterogeneous tournaments enable the …rms to induce the highest e¤orts (i.e. e¤orts that are closest to the e¢ cient level).
Proposition 3 Suppose that the conditions from Proposition 2 hold, let assumption (A1) be ful…lled, and let t be su¢ ciently small. Then, in equilibrium, n 2 of the N …rms each hire one worker of type 1 and one worker of type 2, while the remaining …rms do not hire a worker at all. Workers of type 1 are paid a …rst-period wage of
and workers of type 2 a wage of
Workers of di¤erent types receive di¤erent …rst and second-period wages, so the change in compensation relative to the …rst period following a win or loss in the tournament may also di¤er for the workers. Denote the di¤erence between the second-period and …rst-period wages for a worker of type 1, upon promotion,
w 1 , and let 2 be de…ned analogously,
We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the conditions from Proposition 3 hold. Then in equilibrium we observe 1 < 2 . This means that the change in compensation upon promotion (relative to the …rst-period compensation) is higher for a worker of type 2 than for a worker of type 1.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that the incentive to exert e¤ort may be higher in a heterogeneous tournament than in a homogeneous one. Proposition 4 sheds more light on this issue.
The proposition shows that workers of type 2 (workers with relatively low ability) have a high incentive to achieve promotion, because winning against a high-ability worker leads to a signi…cant upgrade in ability assessment and thus to a higher wage. On the contrary, the ability assessment of a type 1-worker (worker of higher ability) does not change signi…cantly if he competes successfully against a low-ability worker. Instead, the worker is motivated to exert e¤ort, because his ability assessment would be strongly downgraded if he were to lose against a worker of low ability. Thus, the worker strives hard to avoid losing in the promotion tournament.
Discussion
There has been a recent discussion in the literature of the empirical relevance of "classic tournaments" in the spirit of Lazear and Rosen (1981) compared to that of "market-based tournaments" analyzed in the current paper. DeVaro (2011) and Waldman (2013a) discuss possible ways to empirically di¤erentiate between these two types of tournament. The model proposed here opens up another possibility for di¤erentiating between classic and market-based tournaments. Whereas workers in classic tournaments decrease their e¤ort as a response to higher worker heterogeneity, the current paper shows that the reaction of workers in market-based tournaments may be opposite, in that they choose a lower e¤ort in homogeneous tournaments than in heterogeneous tournaments. Thus, by analyzing the reaction of contestants to heterogeneity, the empirical relevance of both types of tournament can be assessed.
Some empirical evidence exists that is in line with our model …ndings. Using data for a medium-sized US …rm in the …nancial-services industry, DeVaro and Waldman (2012) less educated employees receive larger wage increases on promotion. However, it should be noted that alternative explanations exist for these …ndings. DeVaro and Waldman (2012) develop a model without slot constraints for the high-level job, so that only a worker's absolute performance determines the promotion decision (and not the worker's performance relative to that of other workers). As in the current model, promotion serves as a signal regarding a worker's ability, and thus a worker's current employer tends to distort the promotion decision and promotes only workers who have su¢ ciently high ability. It is found that the promotion decision is less distorted for workers with a high level of education. Moreover, since workers with a high level of education are more productive than workers with a low level of education, the e¤ect of promotion on the labor market assessment of a worker's ability decreases with the level of education of the worker. Both e¤ects imply that wage increases upon promotion are smaller for workers whose level of education is high rather than low. In contrast, in the current model the promotion decision is based on the relative performance of workers. Thus, the improvement in a worker's ability assessment upon promotion depends not only on his own expected ability, but also on that of the worker he was competing against. Accordingly, the change in ability assessment is more signi…cant if a worker is promoted even though he had to compete against a rival who is believed to have high ability.
Waldman (2013b) reports on empirical evidence indicating that education is positively related to promotion probability. This …nding is consistent with the current model. To understand this, continue to assume that the level of education is a proxy for expected ability. If …rms hire homogeneous workers, each worker has a promotion probability of 0.5 regardless of his expected ability and thus his level of education. However, we …nd that …rms hire heterogeneous workers, so that workers with high expected ability are more likely to be promoted than workers with low expected ability. Again, it should be noted that alternative explanations for the positive relation between education and promotion probability exist.
14 Some empirical studies analyze the e¤ects of contestant heterogeneity in tournaments. In contrast to the current model, these studies seem to suggest that contestant heterogeneity leads to a lower e¤ort, because of which tournament organizers try to avoid high contestant heterogeneity. Brown (2011) demonstrates that PGA golfers need 0.2 additional strokes on average to complete the …rst round when Tiger Woods participates in a tournament relative to when he is absent. This can be understood as evidence of lower e¤ort in response to higher player heterogeneity. Knoeber and Thurman (1994) study broiler production, in which producers contract with growers to raise their broiler chickens and reward them depending on their performance relative to other growers. Knoeber and Thurman …nd evidence that is in line with notions that producers handicap growers of high ability and producers sort growers into homogeneous tournaments. At …rst sight, these results seem to be inconsistent with the model presented here. However, it should be noted that the present model applies to rather young contestants, about whom little is initially known so that the relative performance signal is used to deduce contestants'abilities. 15 The previous studies consider all 14 See, for instance, Gibbons and Waldman (2006) . 15 A similar argument is used by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and by Altonji and Pierret (2001) , who study employer learning about worker ability. Both studies use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to test predictions arising from their models, precisely because learning about worker ability is likely to be most important at the beginning of a worker's career. The …nding by DeVaro and Waldman (2012) that employees with a Masters or Ph.D. degree receive a smaller wage increase on promotion compared to that for employees with a Bachelors degree holds for the …rst promotion, but not for subsequent promotions.
contestants, regardless of their age. 16 An empirical test of the model requires that the …eld of contestants be segregated by age. For young contestants, learning of their ability is important so that contestant heterogeneity increases the incentive to exert e¤ort, as shown in the present model. In contrast, the characteristics of older contestants may already be well known. Here, heterogeneity is expected to have a negative impact on e¤ort, as demonstrated in "classic tournament models". Another important model assumption is that external employers can observe the …eld of contestants to assess whether a worker had to compete against strong or weak rivals. Accordingly, the model is most likely to refer to …rms or industries that are rather transparent. In many cases, …rms provide information on their websites about people working in di¤erent divisions. Even if this type of information is rather crude (sometimes only the employee names are given), it could be complemented by information gathered from other sources such as LinkedIn. In this way, a fairly accurate picture of the set of contestants could be constructed.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate market-based tournaments in which …rms use promotion decisions to estimate workers' abilities. Workers have an incentive to exert e¤ort to achieve promotion, because promotion has a positive impact on their ability assessment. We demonstrate that ability assessments are more sensitive to promotion decisions when workers are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. Therefore, in a heterogeneous tournament, workers may exert higher e¤ort, because they have a stronger incentive to a¤ect the tournament outcome. Hiring of heterogeneous workers is then optimal for …rms.
More generally, the latter …nding implies that policies aimed at "leveling the playing …eld" are not always as bene…cial as they may appear. If workers succeed in spite of many Again, this indicates that learning about worker ability is of particular importance when workers are young. 16 In addition, at least some of the rewards are …xed before the start of a tournament in professional golf.
While a golfer's future compensation (e.g. through endorsement deals) may depend on how …rms assess the golfer's ability, the prizes that can be won in a given tournament are …xed and do not depend on ability assessments. This latter e¤ect may of course confound the results and lead to a negative relation between contestant heterogeneity and the incentive to exert e¤ort. Formally, if the tournament winner receives a prize of w in addition to the prize we have determined in our model, then the inequality in Proposition 2 becomes
(0) , which is more di¢ cult to satisfy than the original condition.
obstacles, the labor market learns a lot about their characteristics, so it can reward the workers generously on this basis. This may induce workers to exert much greater e¤ort than when the playing …eld is a leveled one.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, it is to be noted that the expected ability of workers that are actually switching …rms is equal to the overall expected ability of workers (conditional on their job assignment at the end of period 1, i.e. E [t j + " j jp j = 1] or E [t j + " j jp j = 0]). This is because of the assumption that in equilibrium workers are never successfully hired away, but a small fraction of workers leaves the …rst-period employer for reasons that are unrelated to ability and job assignment.
Consider worker j and suppose that this worker has been promoted at the end of the …rst period (p j = 1). Denote by w 2 the highest wage o¤er to the worker in = 2. Suppose that
If worker j's …rst-period employer is among the highest bidders, he retains the worker for sure. Then, one of the other …rms would gain by deviating and o¤ering a wage from the interval (
employer is not among the highest bidders, the …rst-period employer gains from deviating and o¤ering a wage from the interval [
. Thus, in equilibrium we never observe
Note that, for any of the external …rms, the o¤er of a wage above
is (weakly) dominated by the o¤er of a wage equal to d 1 + c 1 E [t j + " j jp j = 1]. This means that in any equilibrium in undominated strategies none of the external …rms o¤ers a wage
Then, of course, worker j's current employer does not …nd it optimal to pay a wage above d 1 + c 1 E [t j + " j jp j = 1] either so that w 2 never exceeds
Finally, it is very easy to con…rm the existence of an equilibrium in which the worker
For instance, a situation in which all the …rms o¤er such a wage represents an equilibrium.
The analysis is completely analogous for a worker who has not been promoted at the end of the …rst period.
Proof of Lemma 2. Because " A and " B are i.i.d., the symmetry of " A and " B implies " A and " B as well as " B and " A are i.i.d. This in turn leads to
Consequently, the …rst-order conditions to the workers'maximization problems immediately imply c 0 (e A1 ) = c 0 (e B1 ). By the strict convexity of c it then follows that e A1 = e B1 =: e, which means that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric. The rest of the lemma follows from inserting e A1 = e B1 and ẽ = 0 into one of the …rst-order conditions.
Proof of Proposition 1. Because " A and " B are i.i.d., we have
Because " A and " B are further symmetrically distributed and is independent of " A and " B we obtain
On one hand, we have
On the other hand, it follows
and consequently
Under consideration of (3), (4), and (5), the derivative of W A with respect to t can be stated as
:
and E [ f ( )] = 0, it immediately follows W 0 A ( t = 0) = 0. Consequently, it is su¢ cient to show that W 00 A ( t) > 0 in a neighborhood of t = 0. We get
At t = 0 and under consideration of (0) = 1 2 and the symmetry properties of f , we obtain
Because f has a unique mode at zero, it follows that E [ f 0 ( )] < 0, so that the preceding condition is always met if
The latter inequality results from the identity
is ful…lled, we have established the existence of > 0 such that 0 ( t) > 0 and consequently sgn( ( t)) = sgn( t) for all t 2 ( ; ). Because
and ( t) > 0, it remains to show that sgn( 0 ( t)) = sgn( t), which immediately follows
Proof of Proposition 2. Due to the implicit de…nition of e according to c 0 (e) =c 1 = W A ( t) ( t) and the convexity of the cost function c it is su¢ cient to show that the right-hand side of the latter equation has a local minimum at t = 0. The …rst derivative of the right-hand side with respect to t corresponds to
and the second derivative is
The latter convergence results from the symmetry of which implies 0 (0) = 0. Consequently, because the term (8) is zero if t = 0 and the latter term is positive by the assumption of the proposition, the function W A ( t) ( t) has a local minimum at t = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Because the labor market is competitive, we will never observe that a worker is not hired at all. The proof is by way of contradiction. Suppose, therefore, that one of the …rms has hired two workers of high ability. Then there must be another …rm that has hired two workers of low ability. Denote the expected total payo¤ of …rm and the two workers in these two situations (i.e. the expected total surplus) by T S HH and T S LL , respectively. Denote the corresponding surplus in a situation, in which a …rm has hired two workers of di¤erent type by T S HL . If T S HL > 0:5 (T S HH + T S LL ), two …rms that have not hired a worker so far, could each hire one worker away from the two other …rms (the …rms could always o¤er a more attractive wage contract than the two other …rms could o¤er in return), contradicting the assumption that a …rm manages to hire two workers of the same type in equilibrium. 17 T S HL > 0:5(T S HH + T S LL ) can be stated as To sum up, for su¢ ciently small t (as assumed in this section), the preceding inequality is always satis…ed.
We therefore have established that from which we obtain w 1 as speci…ed in Proposition 3. w 2 is determined analogously.
Proof of Proposition 4. Inserting w 1 and w 2 as speci…ed in Proposition 3 into
The inequality can be rewritten as
Obviously, the …rst term is strictly positive. It remains to be shown that the sum of the second, third and fourth term is non-negative. We have assumed that the …rm always decides to promote one of the workers to the high-level job at the end of the …rst period. A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for the optimality of this kind of behavior is that (see footnote 5)
Note that (c 2 c 1 )
(1 ( t )) E [t L + " B j " A " B + < t ] 
Note that the expression on the left-hand-side of the inequality is strictly bigger than
This completes the proof of the proposition.
